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CONCEPTUALIZING CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION: THE LEGACY 
OF KEITH KREHBIEL’S INFORMATIONAL THEORY 
Madalyn Browning-Perry 
 
Abstract: A small-scale replication of Keith Krehbiel’s original test on the 99th Congress 
is carried out in this paper. This replication consists of four committees in the 112th 
Congress selected because of their symptomatic distributive tendency.  The aim in this 
paper is to characterize committees as diverse in composition with heterogeneous high-
demanding members who possess different bits of information. Furthermore, this 
heterogeneity of membership is associated with a higher percentage of closed rules 
assigned to the committee by the House Committee on Rules. Though evidence supports 
Krehbiel’s assessment of committee composition, there does not appear to be a 
relationship between membership heterogeneity on committees and the number of closed 
rules it is granted.  
INTRODUCTION 
For many years, theorists have attempted to rationalize and explain congressional 
organization. Though many competing ideas have taken shape over time, research and 
experimentation have developed two prevailing schools of thought: the distributive 
theory and the informational theory. These theories ultimately aim to understand the 
dynamic of power within Congress, and the manifestations of this power on 
congressional rules and norms within the chambers themselves. As to the former, 
working within the framework of the informational theory, this research argues that 
committees in the 112th Congress are diverse with heterogeneous high-demanding 
members who possess different bits of information. As to the latter, this paper argues that 
greater heterogeneity of membership on a committee is associated with a higher 
percentage of closed rulings given to that committee by the House Committee on Rules.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Distributive Theory  
 David Mayhew’s distributive theory of legislative organization dominates the 
literature on Congress. Mayhew posits that committees are stacked with homogenous 
high-demanding members who can work collectively to bring home legislative goods that 
benefit their constituencies equally. This theory assumes that legislators are ultimately 
concerned with reelection. Therefore, every action of members is in pursuit of this goal. 
As Mayhew describes, legislators are “single-minded seekers of reelection” (Mayhew, 
2004, 17). It is a rational presumption that members, as human beings, will generally act 
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in their own best interest. It logically follows that in order to reach the other two goals of 
achieving power within the chamber and producing “good” public policy, that all 
members must be elected. Reelection is universal and as distributive theorists explain, 
reelection leads to membership on committee. Membership in general is necessary, but 
continuing membership on specific committees that are relevant to a member’s 
constituency is crucial. Evidence shows that incumbents are reelected at high rates. This 
decreases the stress of election and is inherently valuable and thus drives all members of 
congress to seek reelection. However, the value of incumbency has risen in recent years: 
“seats are not as safe as they seem… many congressmen have won by less than 55 
percent” (Mayhew, 2004, 32). Furthermore, vote variation fluctuates depending on the 
“mood” of the electorate, which makes the electoral outcome uncertain. This high 
uncertainty of reelection affects members’ behavior. In pursuit of reelection and 
placement on a committee of interest, it is essential that members are successful in 
distinguishing themselves from others. In order to successfully accomplish this, Mayhew 
explains members engage in advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking.  
 Mayhew describes advertising as the practice of creating a positive image of 
oneself. Demonstrating personal qualities such as experience, knowledge, and 
responsiveness is largely done through direct mailings to voters at the public’s expense. 
The main goal of the member is to present himself or herself in a positive light that will 
encourage voters to reelect him. Members also engage in credit-claiming, or actively 
taking credit for bringing home legislative goods. The membership is tasked with a 
challenge, to convince constituents that he or she as a member is responsible for securing 
certain “particularized benefits” for the constituency. Credit-claiming allows members to 
build a resume to showcase the tangible benefits they secured for voters; there is “a 
tendency for winners to take personal credit for victories” (Mayhew, 2004, 38). The third 
way by which members distinguish themselves is through position-taking, or the “public 
enunciation of judgmental statements” (Mayhew, 2004, 61). These declaratory judgments 
emphasize a member’s opinion and implicitly or explicitly connect a member to a 
specific issue. The goal is that the constituents acknowledge the member’s position in an 
electorally positive way.  
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 Using these three activities, members must collectively work together to pass 
legislation and secure benefits to make themselves appealing, each to their own 
constituency. Insofar as the member’s interests do not conflict this may be possible. 
Mayhew goes on to explain that each member is “entitled to his share of the benefits” 
(Mayhew, 2004, 88). Neither party nor seniority matters in distributive theory because 
Congressmen are all American and according to the rules of Congress that are precise 
enough to “admit judgment of benefits…” yet “ambiguous enough to allow members to 
claim personal credit” in the end, all members manage to obtain individual goods for 
their constituencies (Mayhew, 2004, 88). 
Rejection of Distributive Theory 
 Mayhew describes the concept of collective action in accordance with collective 
agreement to benefit all. Mayhew, while in keeping with what could be argued as the 
ethical tradition of American democracy, intended by the Framers, to “form a more 
perfect union [by all and for all],” and also to collectively “…promote the general welfare 
[equally],” is idealistic and, furthermore, it is unrealistic. In “conjuring up a vision of the 
United States congressmen as single-minded seekers of reelection,” Mayhew assumes 
that legislators are primarily focused on their personal reelection to office. Secondly, he 
assumes United States congressmen, who are focused on the interest of their competing 
constituencies, can work together in order to capture gains from trade to benefit everyone 
(Mayhew, 2004). Working together, or logrolling, a this-for-that agreement between 
members to vote for policy unravels exceedingly quickly during floor discussion. 
Krehbiel argues this is because of the heterogeneity of membership on committees. 
Heterogeneity of membership introduces difficulty for two reasons. The first difficulty is 
that the competing interests of constituencies cause members to have competing interests. 
Thus arises the struggle of members to collectively come to an agreement. The second is 
that information across these committees is asymmetric. This ensues because, 
“Asymmetries in incoming legislator’s talents [or expertise] give rise to asymmetries [in 
knowledge] in a policy area” (Krehbiel, 1991, 248). Members do not have equal access to 
policy information in all areas. This creates a prisoner’s dilemma within the chamber, 
because there is uncertainty of how each member will act.  
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 In the effort to obtain pork for their constituency, members have an incentive to 
cheat the agreement because each distrusts the other. Though members are high 
demanding, the fact that committee membership is heterogeneous undermines a 
member’s ability to demand effectively. The linchpin of distributive theory is collective 
action to secure tangible benefits. In the event members fail to act collectively, which is 
common in the modern congress, distributive framework becomes limited in its 
applicability. It is then unsuccessful in rationalizing the modern Congress.  
 Informational Theory 
 Keith Krehbiel offers instead an alternative to the distributive theory, the 
informational theory of legislative organization. Krehbiel argues that committees are 
diverse with heterogeneous high-demanding members and that every member holds 
different pieces of information. Krehbiel argues each member has a personal agenda, 
similar to the reasoning proposed by distributive theorists, however, he argues committee 
membership is heterogeneous. Krehbiel addresses uncertainty by acknowledging that 
uncertainty is caused by asymmetric information across committees. Krehbiel’s concept 
of heterogeneity in combination with asymmetric information across committees offers 
an answer to the problem of collective action. He reasons that during floor debates, 
asymmetric information that is indicative of a member’s strategy to procure tangible 
benefits is exposed. Exposing information uncovers the “hidden agenda” of members, 
and it instigates debate over pieces of legislation that are suspect to favor one member’s 
constituency over that of another member’s. Krehbiel sought to prove this theory using 
the 99th Congress as the test subject. He measured heterogeneity of membership by 
utilizing policy specific interest group scores assigned to members of every committee. 
He found that all but one committee, the Armed Services Committee, was in fact 
heterogeneous in the 99th Congress. Furthermore, that this heterogeneity promoted 
competition between members expose the hidden agenda of other members and allowed 
legislation to be discussed thoroughly. Thorough debate is an answer to why logrolling is 
not always successful. Krehbiel, like Mayhew, believes that members have a goal of 
reelection, however, unlike Mayhew, Krehbiel believes reelection is one of three 
overarching goals. The other two goals are to achieve power within the chamber and to 
produce good public policy, that is policy that supports what is in the constituents’ best 
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interest. Krehbiel reasons that reelection derives its worth from achieving power within 
the chamber and producing “good” public policy.  Another component to Krehbiel’s 
design is the idea that the House Committee on Rules recognizes committee 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, rewards heterogeneity by granting a “restrictive” rule on 
legislation. A “restrictive” rule symbolizes trust that diversity in committee membership 
has thoroughly checked legislation through meticulous examination and rigorous debate. 
Thereby producing a “better,” more moderate piece of policy legislation because of this 
competitive debate. Krehbiel inferred that in the 99th Congress the percentage of closed 
rules and rules that were restrictive in their terms of debate had increased. Though the 
original intent of the heterogeneous committee members was to use power to expose the 
agenda of the opposite side, it ultimately led members to create “good” public policy 
overall and led to the development of more legitimate committees trusted by the House 
Committee on Rules. This paper uses the logic of the informational theory framework to 
challenge the dominant merit of the distributive theory in assessing congressional 
organization. 
Selection of the Informational Theory  
Analysis in this paper is focused on the committee: the committee is an 
institutional piece of Congress and if “the primary empirical focus [of this paper] is on 
committees” then it seems “the most promising empirical approach, is an institutional 
approach” (Krehbiel, 1991, 14). Krehbiel also mentions that “...the predictions of 
distributive and informational theories of legislative organization are least ambiguous and 
most direct in terms of institutions” (Krehbiel, 1991, 14). Each theory, because of its 
focus on committees as the central form of organization and power in Congress, has a 
certain degree of testing stability. Furthermore, there is an element of testing reliability in 
the easily measurable variables because the informational theory experiment can be 
duplicated with relative ease.  Secondly is the informational theory offers a polar opposite 
conceptualization of the dynamic of power within committees compared to the 
distributive theory.   
 It is the aim of this paper to duplicate Krehbiel’s design by testing the 
informational theory of legislative organization on the 112th Congress. In constructing a 
smaller-scale design of Krehbiel’s work, the research seeks that committees in the 112th 
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Congress are indeed diverse with heterogeneous high-demanding members and that this 
heterogeneity is associated with a higher percentage of “closed” rules granted by the 
House Committee on Rules.  
There are three reasons to duplicate Krehbiel’s design. ; The first is Krehbiel’s 
design has not been replicated since the 99th Congress. The academic integrity of the 
informational theory would benefit from a more recent test of its merits. The second 
reason is that though legislators want to secure particularized benefits, like distributive 
theorists suggest, it cannot be the sole reason for member’s actions; the distributive 
theory is too simplistic. Article I of the Constitution, explicitly authorizes the duties and 
powers to the legislature. It could be gathered that the Framers of the Constitution 
intended Congress to be microcosmic of the American public, in that members in the 
House could be average citizens, while membership in the Senate was reserved for a 
smaller, more enlightened group. It could be reasoned that because the legislature is the 
first branch drafted in the Constitution and is textually the longest, that the Framers 
intended it to be the most powerful branch; and with this power comes the honorable 
responsibility of preserving the founding values of this country. The explicit and implicit 
expectations of legislature make it multidimensional. The “predictions of the 
informational theory received considerable support,” on multidimensional tasks such as, 
“pork barrel politics, capturing gains from trade, and solving chaos problems” ideas only 
one-dimensionally analyzed in the context of the distributive theory (Krehbiel, 1991, 
258). This corresponds to the third reason for replicating Krehbiel’s design, to understand 
how hyperpolarization affects committee selection. Today when there is so little party 
overlap, members who are unsuccessful in securing the three main goals of committee 
membership stand more to lose today than in the past. In this way, losses intensify for a 
member with a low success rate.  It would seem logical that the legislature would want to 
stop committees from being particularistic. In other words, polarization should 
incentivize the leadership, responsible for preserving the honor of the legislature, to 
create heterogeneous committees with the hope that those committees moderate policies 
that would balance the two party extremes. This incentive is evidenced by a simple 
comparison of the percentage of “closed” rules granted to the 99th Congress to the 
percentage of “closed” rules in the 112th Congress. The nature of “closed” rules has 
 RES PUBLICA XXI 
 
 
84 
 
changed over time. In a progression from the 103rd Congress to the 113th Congress, the 
percentage of “closed” rules granted at the aggregate level has increased from nine 
percent to 48 percent (Davidson, 1994, 221). Considering this increase, one observes a 
higher percentage of “closed” rules granted to each committee in the 112th Congress, 
being in a time of hyperpolarization.  
METHODOLOGY 
Congress and Committee Selection 
After choosing to duplicate the informational theory of legislative organization, 
the 112th Congress is selected for analysis and as a comparison to the 99th Congress. The 
reason being that the 112th Congress was the most recent congressional record available.  
This partial replication of Krehbiel’s design presented several challenges, one 
being the large number of committee members in the chamber.  The research conducted 
found it necessary to focus on specific committees. The four committees chosen to test 
are  the Agriculture Committee, Armed Services Committee, Education and the 
Workforce Committee, and Financial Services Committee.  These committees have a 
tendency toward distributive theory, seem to be issue specific and may have 
particularistic policy-based membership. Selecting committees that have a symptomatic 
distributive tendency would strengthen Krehbiel’s counter conceptualization of 
congressional organization in the event the results support the hypothesis posed by the 
informational theory. In any case, if the results are not supported by the informational 
theory the selection shows academic fairness.   
Bivariate Test Selection 
 Running the bivariate test is to assess if there is a strong relationship between the 
interest group scores, an approval rating of a member in a specific committee compared 
to the Poole and Rosenthal nomination scores, ideological scores dependent on voting 
pattern by committee. A strong relationship between the two would indicate each score 
could be used in place of the other. The use of the Poole and Rosenthal scores of the 
chamber should produce the same test results as the interest group scores. Krehbiel 
favored the interest group scores and chose to use those for his original design because 
the interest group scores take into consideration a member’s voting pattern. The Poole 
and Rosenthal scores would only characterize a member’s ideology, not paying attention 
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to individual action. For instance, say a member is conservative on the Agriculture 
Committee; having grown up on a farm, the member may lean towards conservatism on 
social issues, preferring low government involvement. However on issues pertaining to 
the land, the member would lean towards liberalism because he favors land subsidies and 
crop insurance, which require high government involvement. This situation touches on 
Krehbiel’s larger idea that the interest group scores expose abnormalities in a member’s 
voting pattern, such as voting with the opposite party, an occurrence the ideological 
scores neglect.  
 Similar to Krehbiel’s study, this research gathers interest group scores for all 
available members in the four committees selected. It was necessary to use the readily 
available ideological scores assigned by Poole and Rosenthal when evaluating the entire 
chamber’s heterogeneity and dispersion. The bivariate test is an attempt to not stray too 
far from Krehbiel’s model. The assumption is that there will be a strong correlation 
between the Poole and Rosenthal scores and the interest group scores. It would support 
the hypotheses if the scores showed a strong correlation because this would indicate little 
difference between the two scores.  
Independent Samples T- Test Selection 
The two-tailed test of central tendency is an attempt to capture Krehbiel’s idea of 
outlyingness. The first part of this process is to identify the distribution of membership on 
committees and examine whether the membership is centered within the committee or if 
membership is spread out on committees. The second task is to identify committees that 
present the same type of organization as the greater chamber for instance a committee 
that displays the same type of distribution, as the larger chamber is microcosmic of the 
entire chamber. If it is found that committees are indeed diverse and microcosms of the 
whole, then Krehbiel’s claim that “committees are diverse with...outlying members” is 
correct.  
Descriptive Statistics Test Selection  
The purpose of the descriptive test is to characterize the committees as either 
“heterogeneous” or “homogeneous” in respect to membership. The standard deviations 
and the means gathered are based on the Poole and Rosenthal scores assigned to each 
member. This test acts as the central evidence of Krehbiel’s assertion of membership as it 
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pertains to committee composition. If it is found that these committees are heterogeneous, 
then this paired with the test of central tendency proves that committee composition 
consists of “…diverse...heterogeneous high-demanding members,” Krehbiel will have 
secured a success in his assumption of committee composition.  
Committee Success Correspondence  
The Rules Committee’s designation of a committee as “legitimate,” or as being 
trustworthy in producing moderate legislation is, according to Krehbiel’s claim, 
predicated on its heterogeneity. A substantial part of Krehbiel’s theory in its 
conceptualization of the committees is that heterogeneous membership will be 
symptomatic of a higher percentage of “closed” rules. This framework includes the 
standard deviations of the Poole and Rosenthal nominate scores of the selected 
committees and the standard deviations of the interest group scores of the selected 
committees. It is the intention of this study to organize the four committees in order of 
their percentage of “closed” rules and then rank them by the standard deviation for both 
the nominate scores and the interest group scores. If Krehbiel is correct in his assumption 
that heterogeneity influences the percentage of “closed” rules, then the order of 
committees assigned by percent “closed” rule should match the order of the standard 
deviation of nominate scores and the standard deviation of the interests groups. 
According to the bivariate test, the difference between the nominate scores and the 
interest group scores may inspire a different match with the committees. The order of one 
of these standard deviations may match better with the order of the committees ranked by 
percentage “closed” rule. The weak relationship between the nominate scores and interest 
group scores for the Agriculture Committee and the Financial Services Committee 
identified in Table 1 should not be problematic to the experiment because though there’s 
a weak correlation between two committees, there is a strong correlation between two 
other committees. In the end the pairing balances out. If there is a correlation between a 
committee’s success rate in obtaining a “closed” rule on a piece of introduced legislation 
and the rank of the standard deviation, then all of Krehbiel’s theory will be proved true as 
it pertains to the 112th Congress.  
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Table 1: Bivariate Test: Between Poole + Rosenthal scores and Interest Group Scores  
 
Committee Correlation Relevance 2-Tailed Significance 
Agriculture  -0.37 WEAK** 0.012 
Armed Services  0.933 STRONG 0.000 
Ed + Workforce  -0.745 STRONG 0.000 
Financial Services  0.346 WEAK** 0.006 
 
 The bivariate correlation, shown in Table 1, shows a weak relationship between 
the issue-specific interest group score and the Poole and Rosenthal score for each 
member on the Agriculture Committee and the Financial Services Committee.  The 
correlation between the Poole and Rosenthal scores and the interest group scores is only 
marginally significant. This means there will be some difference in Krehbiel’s test using 
interest group scores compared to the study’s test using the Poole and Rosenthal scores. 
The magnitude of the weak negative correlation in the Agriculture Committee represents 
the idea that just because a member is on the Agriculture Committee does not mean that 
the individual member is necessarily liberal. Similarly, a member of the Financial 
Services Committee is not necessarily always conservative.   
  There is a partial correlation in the two-tailed significance of the bivariate test for 
both committees that possess a weak correlation. In the Committee on Agriculture, this 
measurement of .012 is not statistically significant and the measurement .006 in the 
Financial Services Committee is only marginally significant. This idea is exemplified in 
Krehbiel’s preferred use of the interest group scores as opposed to using the Poole and 
Rosenthal scores. He believed the interest group scores, depending on member voting 
patterns, were a better way to characterize the membership on committees, more so than a 
simple ideological score. This choice introduces the idea of party. In fact a member may 
be a Republican on the Armed Services Committee, however, he might not always vote 
with the Republican Party in all situations. The interest group scores take this factor into 
account. The Poole and Rosenthal scores are one-dimensional; a member is either liberal 
or conservative to a degree.  Scores assigned to members from an issue-specific group, 
which correlate to the member’s committee, offer a multidimensional measure of a 
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member’s supportiveness while working with the committee to obtain legislative goods 
for the specific interest group.  The interest groups that assign a member’s score are 
policy experts in their specified area, so Krehbiel ultimately trusts that their assessment of 
a member is accurate based on the member’s character, work ethic, and success in 
obtaining legislative goods for the interest group.  
 Conversely, there is a strong relationship between the Poole and Rosenthal score 
and the issue-specific interest group score for the Armed Services Committee and the 
Committee on Education and the Workforce. The magnitude of the positive correlation 
for the Armed Services Committee .933 (p> .05) leads one to conclude that members on 
this particular committee tend to be conservative. Similarly, the score of the Education 
and Workforce Committee -.745 (p> .05) is a strong negative ideological correlation.  
Members on the Education and Workforce Committee lean toward liberal ideologies. 
Though there might be a tendency of liberalism or conservatism on a committee that does 
not mean the committee is homogeneously dominated by a singular political party. 
Rather, it is appealing to ideological variance, not a specific party. A committee that 
appeals to a specific ideological variance does attract ideologically homogenous interest 
groups, which can create a discrepancy in the interest group scores of members.  If 
Republicans are evaluated from a liberal interest group, their scores will most likely be 
lower, not because of their work ethic, or their supportiveness, but because the member is 
Republican.  
Table 2: Independent Samples T-Test: Poole and Rosenthal Scores 
 
 GOP Democrats  
Committee Mean Sig. (compared to .05) Mean Sig. (compared to .05) 
Agriculture 0.003 Different 0 Different 
Armed Services 0.713 Same 0.241 Same 
Ed + Workforce 0.855 Same 0.968 Same 
Financial Services  0.53 Same 0.652 Same 
  
This test of central tendency, organized and assessed in terms of political party in all four 
committees, identified the difference in mean for each committee by utilizing the Poole 
and Rosenthal membership scores. Based on the information discovered, three of the four 
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committees show a distribution in mean for both parties that mimic the distribution of the 
party caucus in the greater chamber. According to Table 2, the Agriculture Committee is 
the only committee of the four that is not a microcosm of the entire chamber, meaning 
that the distribution of the mean for both Republicans and Democrats on the committee 
does not match the distribution of mean of Republicans and Democrats in the greater 
chamber. Furthermore, the Agriculture Committee is an outlier compared to the other 
three committees. This test is successful because the data is in cadence with Krehbiel’s 
theory; that membership within committees mirrors membership in the greater chamber 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
*Based on Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE Scores 
 GOP  Democrats  
Committee  STDV MEAN STDV MEAN 
Party Caucus  0.256513 0.67058 0.276522 -0.32284 
**Agriculture  0.421967 0.5078 0.525884 0.03667 
Armed Services  0.166371 0.66917 0.10479 -0.31281 
Ed + Workforce  0.148266 0.67574 0.302142 -0.36225 
Financial Services  0.21917 0.71488 0.114038 -0.3843 
[Agriculture committee is the outlier] 
 This data summary employing the nomination scores substantiates Krehbiel’s 
claim show that the membership on committees, like membership within the party 
caucus, is generally heterogeneous. The table above is a comparison of the means and 
standard deviations of the each of the four committees compared to that of the party 
caucus. It was found that the scores of members on the Agriculture Committee have a 
standard deviation of .4219 (p> .05), which was substantially wider than the party caucus 
of .2565 (p> .05). This indicates that the Agriculture Committee is stacked with diverse 
members, more so than the three other committees. This is in line with Krehbiel’s 
reasoning that leadership would be inclined to stack committees with diverse 
heterogeneous members in the effort to cast a wide expertise in committees and 
ultimately insight more debate over legislation. In light of the findings in Table 3, it is not 
surprising to discover that a committee, which is not microcosmic in relation to the entire 
chamber, is in fact a “membership-outlier.” Aside from Krehbiel’s idea, there might be a 
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reason for this outlyingness, which could be the geographical presence of agriculture is 
across the country. Thus it attracts many different types of members across states purely 
because of its prevalence around the country.  
 Though the Agriculture Committee is a manifestation of the informational theory 
that is not to say the others tend toward distributive theory. The standard deviation of the 
nominate scores is a measure of heterogeneity, but the mean is arguably the more 
important indicator of a committee’s heterogeneity in relation to the greater chamber. The 
three committees, Armed Services, Education and the Workforce, and Financial Services, 
possess a mean that is very close to the mean of the party caucus. Because of this 
similarity, there is confidence in characterizing them as heterogeneous as well.  
Table 4: Committee Success Correspondence*  
    Rank (1-4) 
Committee 
% Closed or 
Structured Rule 
STDV 
(PR Score %) 
STDV 
(IG Score %) 
STDV 
(PR Score %) 
STDV 
(IG Score %) 
Ed +Workforce 0.5 0.562 0.47 2 1 
Agriculture 0.45 0.527 0.262 3 3 
Financial 
Services 
0.294 0.578 0.14 1 4 
Armed Services 0.2 0.509 0.39 4 2 
* Ordered by % “Closed” + “Restrictive” Rule 
 Table 4 summarizes what could be called the committee success rate in securing 
“closed” and “restrictive” rules. Originally, the intent was to use only rules that were 
“closed” to measure the Rules Committee as either having complete trust or no trust at all 
in the committee granted the rule. However, the Armed Services Committee was not 
granted any “closed’ rules on introduced legislation, which led the thought closed rule 
was too a qualification of trust. Out of the four rulings a committee can be granted; 
closed, restrictive, modified open, and open. The “restrictive” rules would be regarded as 
the second highest indication of trust.  
This qualification was of substance and deserved to be recognized. Thus, the 
committees are now ordered by the percentage of “closed” and “restrictive” rules each 
was granted on introduced legislation. The columns following “closed” and “structured” 
rules are the standard deviations for both the nominate scores and the interest group 
scores. These indicate the heterogeneity in each of the committees. The standard 
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deviations were then ranked from high to low. Table 4 shows that there is only a correct 
match of the deviations for the Agriculture Committee and the Committee on Education 
and the Workforce. That is, Krehbiel’s prediction that heterogeneity drives “closed” rules 
was only correct for two of the four committees.  
CONCLUSION - NEED TO ADD IN THE CHAMBERS TENDENCY TOWARD 
RESTRICTIVE RULES 
 
 It was discovered that in fact a committee’s heterogeneity is not necessarily 
indicative of its reward of a “closed” rule by the House Rules Committee. Though this 
was the case, the experiment was a partial success and there is room to improve its 
accuracy. Krehbiel was correct in his conceptualization of committee composition, 
however the trust the House Rules Committee has in the composition of committee 
membership may not be represented in the measurable form of a “closed” rule. Trust may 
be shown in other areas, such as the speed by which a committee’s bill is scheduled on 
the calendar for debate. There may be “legislative perks” a trusted committee receives 
that are not measurable, such compensation and access to legislative resources.  
 A successful committee may not be characterized as a committee that attains a 
“closed” rule. Instead, “successful committee members influence others not by wielding 
formal authority by engaging in command-and-control tactics, but rather they persuade” 
(Krehbiel, 1991, 256). One interpretation of this is that “successful” committees are 
thought achieve more “closed” rules on bills introduced. This might seem intriguing, but 
the logic is flawed because there are committees, like the Armed Services Committee, 
that managed to successfully pass legislation into law, without a “closed” rule. A more 
compelling answer to why heterogeneity is not necessarily rewarded a “closed” rule and 
furthermore why a closed rule is not necessarily indicative of trust is because persuasion 
within the chamber is assumed. Rather than using “command-and-control tactics” in the 
form of a “closed” rule, heterogeneous committee membership would be trusted to 
persuade other internal members. In the presence of hyperpolarization, it is logical to 
assume the House Committee on Rules has a plan to combat the problems introduced by 
hyperpolarization. If  “successful committee members [can] influence others…by 
persuasion” then it could be reasoned the most successful committees are those that 
manage to pass legislation with the weight of a “modified” or “open” rule. In these 
instances committees awarded a “modified” or “open” rule require the members to use 
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the “essence of committee power,” persuasion, in order to be successful (Krehbiel, 1991, 
256).  
 In the effort to understand legislative organization “one must understand 
legislative institutions, that is the rules and binding constraints on legislator’s behavior” 
(Krehbiel, 1991, 14). Krehbiel’s informational theory of legislative organization offers 
the best conceptualization of congressional organization. Replicating his design, though 
on a smaller-scale and for the 112th Congress, has added academic merit to the 
informational theory. It was found that in the 112th Congress, committees are diverse with 
heterogeneous high-demanding members possessing asymmetric information. 
Furthermore, it could be argued this diversity in membership is indicative of a multi-
dimensional virtuousness of the legislature because the leadership intentionally creates 
these diverse heterogeneous committees in the effort to limit the effects of 
hyperpolarization on committee operation. Membership of committees is intentionally 
diverse in the hope of producing the “best,” type of legislation through meticulous 
examination and rigorous debate. The “best” type of legislation, meaning the debate 
between members has exposed the “hidden evils,” of the opposite side and produced a 
more pure, more virtuous piece of legislation. The content of the legislation may not 
necessarily be virtuous, but the method of debate and examination in the diverse 
heterogeneous committees is what is virtuous, in that it produces a more dignified piece 
of legislation.  
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